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main results. First, the store with no buyer market power responds to the presence of the large 
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the traditional retailer. Contrary to the conventional wisdom most of the consumer welfare gains 
seem due to the latter. The intuition for this result is that price competition softens substantially as 
a result of firms’ quality differentiation. We also investigate the effects of buyer market power on 
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Keywords:  buyer market power, vertical differentiation, Wal-Mart 
JEL Classification:  D43, L13, L81, M31, Q13 
________________________ 
1Shinn-Shyr Wang, Department of Resource Economics 
University of Massachusetts, 212A Stockbridge Hall  
80 Campus Center Way, Amherst, MA  01003-9246 
E: wang@resecon.umass.edu  P: 413-545-5738  F: 413-545-5853 
 
2Christian Rojas, Department of Resource Economics 
University of Massachusetts, 219B Stockbridge Hall  
80 Campus Center Way, Amherst, MA  01003-9246 
E: rojas@resecon.umass.edu  P: 413-545-2496  F: 413-545-5853 
 
3Nathalie Lavoie, Department of Resource Economics 
University of Massachusetts, 212D Stockbridge Hall  
80 Campus Center Way, Amherst, MA  01003-9246 
E: lavoie@resecon.umass.edu  P: 413-545-5713  F: 413-545-5853 Buyer Market Power and Vertically Differentiated Retailers 







We consider a model of vertical competition where downstream firms (retailers) purchase an 
upstream input from a monopolist and are able to differentiate from each other in terms of 
quality. Our primary focus is to study the effects of introducing a large retailer, such as a Wal-
Mart Supercenter, that is able to lower wholesale prices (i.e. buyer market power). We obtain 
two main results. First, the store with no buyer market power responds to the presence of the 
large retailer by increasing its quality, a finding that is consistent with recent efforts by 
traditional retailers to enhance shoppers’ buying experience (i.e. quality). Second, the presence 
of a large retailer causes consumer welfare to increase. There are, however, two reasons for the 
increase in consumer welfare: consumers gain from the large retailer’s low price (because the 
upstream discount is partially passed on to the retail price) as well as from the high quality level 
offered by the traditional retailer. Contrary to the conventional wisdom most of the consumer 
welfare gains seem due to the latter. The intuition for this result is that price competition softens 
substantially as a result of firms’ quality differentiation. We also investigate the effects of buyer 
market power on retail and wholesale prices as well as on producer welfare. 
 
Keywords: buyer market power, vertical differentiation, Wal-Mart 
JEL Code: D43, L13, L81, M31, Q13 
                                                 
* Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst. Contact email: Wang 
<wang@resecon.umass.edu>. We gratefully acknowledge support from USDA-NRI grant 2008-35400-18700.  
 
2 
1.  Introduction 
For decades, researchers and policy makers have been concerned with the negative 
effects of imperfect markets in the food industry. Most of the attention has focused on seller 
concentration  and its association  with higher prices, reduced consumer surplus, and larger 
profits. Under this “unidirectional” market power approach, downstream agents (buyers) play a 
passive role by accepting the price set by upstream firms. However, recent concentration trends 
in downstream markets (i.e. food processors and retailers) require a closer look at the existence 
and effects of buyer market power; ignoring bidirectional market power can produce biased 
results when analyzing important policy questions, such as how welfare is affected by mergers or 
by the presence of large retail chains.
1
Unlike other inputs such as energy, oil or labor, agricultural products are either purchased 
in raw form by final consumers or are  transformed (processed) in some way. These 
characteristics  make buyer market power especially  relevant in  agricultural  markets. For 
example, agricultural products are often sold to a handful of firms that specialize in processing it; 
this is notably reflected by the consolidation of food processors as buyers of farmers’ outputs. In 
addition, a large fraction of fresh produce output is channeled through large and increasingly 
dominant retail chains: in 2005 food sales by the four largest retailers at the national level was 
35.5% while food sales by the four largest retailers in a local metropolitan area was, on average, 
 More specifically, the ubiquitous negative connotation 
that  market power is given  may need to be reconsidered  by antitrust legislators and policy 
makers as buyer market power may, for example, help consumers buy at lower prices (Dobson et 
al, 2001). 
                                                 
1 The two most commonly used terms in the literature are buyer market power and countervailing market power. We 
employ the former as it is more intuitive when referring to a buyer’s ability to push upstream prices down (whether 
it emerges from lack of competition among buyers or simply because the seller has an inherent superior 
“negotiating” ability). In this paper we assume there is buyer market power, without seeking to explain its existence.  
 
3 
72.3% (ERS, 2000; 2007).
2
Being the largest retailer in the United States, Wal-Mart’s 2008 revenues were more than 
the total combined revenues of the next six U.S. retailers (Kroger, Costco, Home Depot, Target, 
Walgreen, and CVS Caremark; Schultz, 2009). Among other things, Wal-Mart is known for its 
low prices: 8-27% lower than conventional retailers (Hausman and Leibtag, 2007). In addition, 
Volpe and Lavoie (2008) show that in response to a Wal-Mart Supercenter’s presence, 
competing supermarkets lower their prices by 6% to 7% lower for national brands and by 3% to 
8% for private labels.
 Importantly, mass merchandisers (e.g. Wal-Mart, Target and Kmart) 
and warehouse clubs (e.g. Costco and Sam’s) are capturing an ever larger share of all food retail 
sales in the United States. Among these merchandisers, Wal-Mart can be a particularly pivotal 
buyer to food manufacturers. Notable examples in the food industry are Procter & Gamble, 
Heinz, and Kraft, who earn at least 10 percent of their annual revenue from sales to Wal-Mart 
(Hopkins, 2003).  
3 Moreover, competing supermarkets have tended to increase the quality of 
the shopping experience by including amenities such as delis, on-site bakeries, coffee shops, gas 
stations,  banks, pharmacies  etc. (Volpe and Lavoie,  2008)  as well as  introducing high-end 
private-label brands.
4
In this paper, we develop a model to study the effects of the presence of a large retailer 
with buyer market power. Specifically, we consider a simple wholesaler-retailer relationship 
 After years of decline brought on by fighting Wal-Mart on price, 
supermarkets appear to be finding a way to win shoppers back by “sharpening their difference 
with Wal-Mart’s price-obsessed supercenters, stressing less-hectic stores with exotic or difficult-
to-match products and greater convenience” (McWilliams, 2007).   
                                                 
2  The second Figure (72.3%) corresponds to 1998. 
3 Other effects of Wal-Mart’s presence are discussed by Basker (2007) and references therein.  
4 A recent study by Bonanno and Lopez (2009) also shows that retailers differentiate themselves from competitors 
and attract less price-sensitive consumers by service competition in fluid milk markets.  
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where retailers buy a good from a monopolist wholesaler and then sell it (without processing) to 
final consumers  (in the remainder of the paper the terms “wholesaler”, “manufacturer” and 
“upstream firm” are used interchangeably).  The application we have in mind is the entry of Wal-
Mart Supercenters, which, with their full line of grocery products, compete with traditional 
supermarkets (in the remainder of the paper the terms “retailer”, “supermarket”, “store” and 
“downstream firm” are used interchangeably). For tractability purposes we focus on duopoly 
competition downstream, namely there is one conventional retailer (i.e. with no buyer market 
power) and  the  other with buyer market power (e.g. Wal-Mart).
5
We compare our equilibrium results to two “no-Wal-Mart” retail configurations: 
monopoly and duopoly. This allows us to evaluate the effect of Wal-Mart’s entry (either by 
addition or substitution of a retailer) on: 1) consumer and producer welfare, and 2) the price and 
quality equilibrium levels. In the absence of a large retailer, the two conventional retailers set 
their quality at the same level and compete with each other in a standard Bertrand fashion. 
Though the profits for both retailers are zero, the wholesaler (as well as consumers) benefit from 
the intense price competition between retailers. In the presence of a large retailer, conversely, the 
degree of quality differentiation depends on the size of the discount (i.e. market power) obtained 
by the retailer: as the discount gets larger, the large retailer has a higher incentive to lower prices 
   Buyer market power is 
measured by a discount rate negotiated between the manufacturer and the retailer, and assumed 
to be exogenous in our model. As opposed to earlier work, a key component of our model is that 
it allows downstream firms to compete not only in prices but also in quality: retailers can choose 
a different level of “service” (i.e., quality of the shopping experience). 
                                                 
5 Given the common association of Wal-Mart with low-prices, the “large retailer” that can negotiate lower prices 
with suppliers in our theoretical model will be often referred to as “Wal-Mart”.  
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and  a decreased incentive  to increase  quality; on the other hand, the conventional retailer 
responds by offering a high-quality/high-priced product. 
We find  that consumer welfare increases because  some  consumers with a strong 
preference for quality benefit from the  high-quality/high-price combination offered by the 
conventional retailer, while some consumers with weaker preference for quality benefit from 
low-quality/low-price combination offered by the large retailer. However, the first effect is much 
larger, suggesting that increases in consumer welfare stemming from lower prices might be 
smaller than usually claimed. A second finding is that producer welfare (i.e. the joint profits of 
upstream and downstream firms) also increases in the presence of a large retailer. The main 
reason for this is that the presence of a large retailer allows the wholesaler to reap the benefits of 
price discrimination between the two retailers. Importantly, producer welfare gains are larger 
than consumer welfare gains. 
The paper is organized as follows. We briefly discuss prior work related to our research 
in section 2. The model and the main results are presented in section 3. Section 4 presents 
robustness  checks  of our model  and  section  5  provides concluding remarks, limitations  and 
suggestions for further research. 
2.  Related Studies 
There are several prior studies on buyer market power, with different focus (i.e. empirical 
vs. theoretical) as well as with different research scopes. However, there have been very few 
attempts to incorporate product differentiation in the analysis.  
An issue related to our work that has been analyzed conceptually is whether increased 
buyer market power by a downstream firm that counteracts seller market power upstream 
translates into a lower price for the final good. The canonical model considers bilateral market  
 
6 
power with a single manufacturer bargaining with competing retailers over the price of a 
homogeneous good. Dobson and Waterson (1997) and von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) show that, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, retail prices can sometimes increase (and welfare decrease) 
with retailer concentration. Chen (2003) assumes a dominant firm structure in the retail market 
and shows that as the bargaining power of the retailer increases, consumers face lower retail 
prices. 
Erutku (2005) relaxes the assumption of a homogeneous product sold by retailers by 
assuming a degree of substitutability between a national retailer’s good and the same good sold 
by a local retailer. Results of the model are ambiguous as retail prices may increase or decrease 
with the degree of buyer market power by the national retailers. Brekke and Straume (2004) also 
study horizontal product differentiation in the context of bilateral monopoly. Their approach, 
however, is to study how bargaining affects the degree of product differentiation downstream 
and find that downstream firms increase product heterogeneity as the supplier’s bargaining 
power increases. 
The buyer market power literature has investigated a variety of other issues that are 
beyond the scope of this paper. For a broader perspective, the interested reader is referred to 
Dobson et al (2001) and Snyder (2008). Dobson et al (and references therein) offer an empirical 
and practical overview of buyer market power; the authors focus on the increased concentration 
of the retail sector in Europe and discuss the implications that the resulting buyer market power 
by  retailers  can have for several  competition  and policy issues.  Snyder, on the other hand, 





3.  Model 
We adopt a three-stage game: in stage 1, retailers select the level of service (quality) to 
provide. In stage 2, the wholesale price to each retailer is determined either through a 
manufacturer’s take-it-or-leave-it offer if the retailer has no buyer market  power  or through 
bargaining between the manufacturer and retailer. As a result, the wholesale price depends on the 
degree of the retailer’s buyer market power. In stage 3, retailers compete and simultaneously set 
retail prices to consumers. 
3.1  Setup 
In this section we model the wholesaler-retailer relationship where retailers buy a product 
from a wholesaler and sell it to consumers. Consider one manufacturer with (seller) market 
power  offering an identical product to two retailers who compete in prices. Retailers are 
differentiated in the level of service they provide to consumers, i.e., quality of the shopping 
experience. We model this vertical differentiation à la Mussa and Rosen (1978). Consumers are 
heterogeneous in their valuation of quality  given by θ . The conditional indirect utility of a 
consumer with a marginal willingness to pay θ  for quality k  and income y  is given by 
y kp θ +−  if one unit of the product of quality k is purchased at price p, and by y if the product 
is not purchased. We assume a continuum of consumers with total mass of one distributed 
uniformly over a unit interval (i.e.,  [0,1] U θ ∈ ). 
Let  L θ  denote the consumer who is indifferent between buying the low-quality product 
and not buying at all, where the subscript L denotes the low-quality product.
6
L θ  Thus,   is the 
value of θ  that solves  LL ykpy θ + −= . Similarly,  H θ  is the consumer that is indifferent 
                                                 
6 Low- (high-) quality product refers to a good purchased at a retailer with low- (high-) quality shopping experience 
as mentioned previously. By shopping experience we mean product display, store lighting, the presence of deli, 
bakery, and butcher shop, etc.  
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between buying the low-  or high-quality product, i.e.,  H θ  is the value of θ  that  solves 
HH LL ykp ykp θθ + −= +− , where the subscript H  denotes the high-quality product. Thus, 
consumers with  [0, ) L θθ ∈  will not buy the product, those with  [, ] LH θ θθ ∈  will buy the low-
quality product and the others  ( ,1] H θθ ∈  will buy the high-quality product. Accordingly, the 
demand for each quality is the length of the consumer interval buying the given quality 
multiplied by the density of consumers along that interval times the total number of consumers, 
N=1, for illustrative convenience. As a result, the demands for the low- and high-quality products 
are: 
  ( ) ( )
,,, ,
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  We consider a three-stage game. In stage 1, retailers select kH and kL, the levels of service 
(quality) to provide. In stage 2, the wholesale price (w) to each retailer is determined either 
through a manufacturer’s (or wholesaler’s) take-it-or-leave-it offer if the retailer has no buyer 
market power or through bargaining between the manufacturer and retailer. In stage 3, retailers 
simultaneously set pH and pL. The subgame perfect equilibrium is solved by backward induction. 
  In this model, Wal-Mart (i.e. the large retailer) has buyer market power and can obtain a 
discount  ( ) 0,1 γ ∈  on the wholesale price, w. The size of the discount is determined through 
bargaining, which is assumed to be exogenous to the problem. The larger is γ , the larger is the 
bargaining (i.e. buyer) power of Wal-Mart. This formulation allows us to nest a “no-Wal-Mart” 
case ( 0 γ = ) and a Wal-Mart case into a single specification. The maximization problem of the 
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where π  denotes profit  and  () C •  is  the  cost of quality improvement.  0 γ =  when the low-
quality retailer is a conventional supermarket, and 0 γ >  when the low-quality retailer is Wal-
Mart. This formulation assumes that the retailer incurs only the costs of buying the product from 
the manufacturer  and its quality improvement.  The quality improvement cost function is 
assumed to be cubic  and  does  not vary  with  the  quantity of products being sold.
7
3
0 ( ) /3 ii ck k −
   It is 
represented by  , i=L, H, where k0 is the minimum quality level and the coefficient 
LH cc ≥  captures the efficiency of quality improvement. That is, the high-quality retailer is more 
efficient at improving quality than the low-quality retailer. To facilitate the derivation of our 
model, we further assume that the coefficient of the quality improvement cost for the high-
quality retailer, cH, and minimum quality level k0 are normalized to 1.
8
 
 Substituting the demand 
and cost expressions into the profit functions, we have 
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7 We employ a cubic cost function because alternatives (such as a quadratic setting) involve too many corner 
solutions. The cubic cost function also provides the necessary convexity. The cost functional form plays an 
important role in determining the equilibrium; however, the qualitative properties of our conclusions, discussed in 
section 4, are robust to other cost specifications. 
8 In principle, the parameter k0 may vary by firm (i.e., could have an i subscript) and may be different from 1. Our 
simplified version allows an easier comparison between the  0 γ =  and  0 γ >  cases, and it makes the computation 
of kL and kH more tractable.  
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Taking the first-order condition on price for each retailer and solving for the retail prices we 
obtain
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 (3 ) ( 2 (1 )) ( )
,,; , ,,; .
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These prices can be substituted into the retailers’ demands  (equations 1 and 2)  to find the 
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The manufacturer maximizes profits from sales to the low-quality retailer (at a discount or not) 
and from sales to the high-quality retailer by choosing w (stage 2). This maximization problem 
can be expressed as: 
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This formulation assumes that the manufacturer does not incur costs. It is straightforward to 
relax this assumption later. From this maximization problem we obtain the manufacturer’s price 
given by  ( ) ,; HL wk k γ , 
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which can be substituted back into the retail demands and prices to solve for the optimal quality 
choices by both retailers. The maximization problem of retailers in stage 1 corresponds to 
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  (5) 
where w is defined in equation (3). From (4) and (5) we obtain the equilibrium quality, and thus 
equilibrium prices and quantities. This stage of the model is solved with numerical methods 
given the non-linearity of the expressions. 
  By solving equations (4) and (5), we can see that the optimal levels of kL and kH are 
functions of γ and cL. That is, in addition to the low-quality retailer’s coefficient of quality 
improvement cost (cL), the optimal quality levels also depend on the discount rate γ, which is the 
measure of buyer market power. Therefore, varying γ  from 0 (a conventional supermarket with 
no bargaining power) to a positive number (Wal-Mart has a superior bargaining position against 
a manufacturer) allows us to evaluate the effect of buyer market power on prices, quality levels, 
and welfare.  
  In the simulation,  we  first  assume the low-quality retailer’s coefficient of quality 
improvement cost is equal to one (cL = 1) and vary the discount rate γ  from 0 to 1 by 0.1 
increments.  For comparison purposes, we also consider the case in which there is only a 
conventional retailer in the market (next section, 3.2); we call this “base case 1” (B1). Section 
3.3 discusses the two-retailer case with  0 γ = , which is labeled as “base case 2” (B2). The two-
retailer case with [0.1,1] γ ∈  is discussed in section 3.4; we label this the “Wal-Mart” case (WM). 
Table 1 shows the corresponding results of B1  (2
nd  row),  B2  (4
th  row) and WM  (5






3.2  Base Case 1 (B1): One Conventional Store 
  When there is one conventional retailer in the market, the maximization problems of the 
retailer and the manufacturer can be written, respectively, as: 
 


































where the subscript B1 stands for “base case 1” (in parentheses for manufacturer’s profits) and 
the coefficient of quality improvement cost (c)  is assumed to be 1.  The corresponding 
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The  second  row of Table 1  displays these results.  As it can be seen, quality is above the 
minimum level (kB1=1.25 > k0=1)
9
3.3  Base Case 2 (B2): Two Conventional Retailers: γ = 0 
, whereas the retail price is 50% larger than the wholesale 
price (0.9375 vs. 0.625). Only 25% of the market and most of society’s welfare is captured by 
firms (0.2292 out of 0.2682) with most of firms’ surplus going to the manufacturer (0.1563 out 
of 0.2292). 
  With two conventional stores, we assume that no retailer receives a discount from the 
manufacturer,  i.e.  they have no buying power  ( 0 γ = ).  Table 1 (row 4) shows  that  both 
conventional retailers set their quality at the same level (
* 1.0004 HL kkk = = = ) and compete 
                                                 
9 Increasing quality above the minimum level is profitable for this monopolistic conventional retailer (πB1 = 7/96 
when kB1 = 5/4 vs. πB1 = 1/16 when kB1 = 1). Note that the quantity demanded remains unchanged with different 
quality levels. Both retail profits and consumer surplus increase due to quality improvement.  
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with  each other in a standard Bertrand fashion  (
* /2 HL wk p p = ≈= ).
10
  Note that both retailers set their quality level higher than 1 even though they receive zero 
profits. To understand why retailers want to improve their quality, let us look at Figure 1 – a 
payoff matrix of strategies in stage 1. Given that the competitor chooses not to improve quality, 
the retailer’s best response is to improve its own quality; conversely, if the competitor decides to 
improve quality, the retailer is indifferent between improving and not improving quality. 
Therefore, (kL > 1, kH > 1) are weakly dominant strategies, implying that both retailers slightly 
improve their quality (from 1 to 1.0004) in stage 1. While profits are zero for retailers under both 
(kL = 1, kH = 1) and (kL > 1, kH > 1), the wholesaler and consumers benefit from this quality 
improvement. Specifically, when kL= kH = 1.0004 (instead of kL = kH = 1) wholesaler’s profits are 
0.2501 instead of 0.25 and consumer surplus is 0.1251 instead 0.125. 
 Since both retailers 
operate at the same quality level, we cannot label low- and high- quality retailers, but we still 
refer to them as L and H for notational convenience. Market demand is 0.5, which is split equally 
between two retailers.  
  Comparing B2 with B1, we find that the quality level as well as wholesale and retail 
prices  decrease;  meanwhile,  the  market demand doubles (from 0.25 to 0.5).  In addition, 
consumer surplus and wholesaler profits increase while total retailer profits decreases. The total 
welfare gains stem entirely from increased retailer competition on prices. One can think of this 
result as an analogue to the  standard  double marginalization problem  (without quality 
competition): a lower degree of market power in a stage of the supply chain (in this case the 
retail level) reduces the double marginalization problem thereby increasing overall profits and 
consumer surplus. This comparison suggests that the entry of a conventional retailer to a market 
                                                 
10 The retailers’ prices (pL and pH) are actually slightly above the wholesale price (w) so that retailers can cover the 
small quality improvement cost. The difference between w and pi is very small and thus can not be seen in Table 1.  
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currently being served by a similar (conventional) store will trigger intense price competition 
(and virtually no quality competition) thereby unambiguously benefiting consumers. 
3.4  Wal-Mart case (WM): One Conventional Store and One “Wal-Mart” Store: γ > 0 
  In this case, one of the retailers in the B2 case above is replaced by a retailer that has 
access to a positive discount γ > 0 (e.g., Wal-Mart).
  In Table 1 (rows 5 through 14) we report 
results for γ∈ [0.1, 1] in 0.1 intervals.
11
The quality level set by the low-quality retailer (i.e. Wal-Mart) has an interesting pattern 
(Figure 2). When the discount rate obtained from the wholesaler is small (γ = 0.1), compared to 
B2, Wal-Mart has an incentive to increase its quality (kL = 1.0441 > 1.0004) and to charge higher 
prices (pL=0.5823 > 0.5002). As the discount rate gets larger, Wal-Mart finds it more effective to 
attract customers through a lower price (for 
 Results in Table 1 lead to several important observations.   
0.3 γ >  Wal-Mart’s price is lower than in B2, see 
Figure 3) rather than by improving its quality (kL = 1 for all  [0.2,1] γ ∈ ). Intuitively, for a large 
enough discount rate (i.e.  0.1 γ > ) the profitability incentive to offer low prices overcomes the 
profitability incentive to attract customers via high quality. 
In response to Wal-Mart’s low price policy, the high-quality  retailer chooses to 
differentiate its product/service by significantly improving the quality level above that observed 
in B2 (kH > 1.2 for all [0.1,1] γ ∈ , see Figure 2), although not always above the quality level of 
1.25 observed in B1. Intuitively, because of its inability to obtain a discount, the conventional 
retailer is at a disadvantage when trying to compete in prices with Wal-Mart; instead it chooses 
to augment its profitability by increasing its quality level. 
                                                 
11  In reality, a portion of the [0.1, 1] interval is likely to be more relevant than the rest for a specific retail chain.  In 
this section, we describe the results for the whole range to provide readers with a broad picture of our model results. 




All prices (wholesale, w, as well as retail, pL  and  pH) exhibit a non-monotonic 
relationship with the discount rate γ  (see Figure 3). The initial price increases are due to the 
initial intense quality competition that retailers engage in: a relatively small bargaining power by 
the low-quality retailer makes both firms focus their competition on quality which results in 
higher equilibrium prices. Conversely, as larger discount rates are achieved prices tend to fall 
because:  a)  the quality levels offered by firms tends to drop (Figure 2)
12
0.3 γ >
, and b) all prices 
inevitably experience intense downward pressure by Wal-Mart’s low price policy. Importantly, 
for   consumers shopping at the low-quality retailer pay lower prices than in B2, whereas 
for  0.5 γ >  all consumers pay a lower price than in B2. 
 Interestingly, a portion of the purchase discount for the low-quality retailer is always 
passed on to consumers. This can be seen in Figure 3: pL < w, which implies that the fraction (w - 
pL)/ w γ  of the discount  w γ  is passed on to consumers (Figure 4). The pass-through rate, (w - 
pL)/ w γ , is decreasing in  γ, which implies that more buyer market power allows the low-quality 
retailer to retain a larger fraction of the discount (and therefore enjoy more profits). Consistently, 
the markup of the low-quality retailer,  (1 ) L pw γ −− , is increasing in γ. 
Market demand is DL + DH = 1 - θL and increasing in the discount rate when  [ ] 0.2,1 γ ∈  
(Figure 5).
13 0.4 γ =  However it is not until   that more consumers join the market (compared to 
B2). In other words, when Wal-Mart replaces a conventional retailer, more customers with lower 
valuations for quality are able to join the market only if Wal-Mart is able to get a sufficiently 
                                                 
12 Except for kH in the  [ ] 0.8,1 γ ∈  range. In general, our model implies that lower equilibrium quality levels need to 
be associated with lower price levels. 
13 Note that when  [ ] 0.1,0.2 γ ∈ , θL increases initially in γ , due to Wal-Mart’s quality improvement.  
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high discount rate from the supplier. Accordingly, it is not until  0.4 γ =  that the low-quality 
retailer sells more than the high-quality retailer.  
In general, all consumers (low-quality as well as high-quality purchasers) tend to gain 
with larger discounts, especially for  0.4 γ >  (Figure 6).  Importantly,  total  consumer surplus 
(Figure 8) is, with one exception ( 0.3 γ = ), always larger in WM than in B2 (and, of course, 
always larger than in B1). Initially (for  [0.1,0.2] γ ∈ ), low-quality purchasers do not gain much 
from the discount Wal-Mart gets, but as γ  grows many new consumers (those below  0.5 θ = ) as 
well as some “old” high-quality consumers start enjoying the lower prices. Conversely, high-
quality consumers always gain from the entry of Wal-Mart, i.e., whether it brings competition to 
a monopolist (WM vs. B1) or whether it replaces a conventional retailer in a duopoly (WM vs. 
B2). 
In terms of profits, the manufacturer prefers a relatively low discount rate, i.e. in the [0.1, 
0.4] range, relative to B2 (see Figure 7). The intuition for this result is that it is in this range 
where product differentiation is maximal (see Figure 2) and therefore more profitable for a 
monopolistic manufacturer to engage in price discrimination. The low-quality retailer enjoys 
greater  profits  at higher discounts (as its ability to gain additional customers is enhanced) 
whereas the high-quality retailer prefers a low discount rate as it enjoys higher prices (Figure 3) 
as well as larger demand (Figure 5).  
Comparing profits with B2, a manufacturer prefers competition between quality 
differentiated retailers (WM) as long as the discount is not too large (i.e. when it can profitably 
engage in price discrimination). However, it may actually prefer double marginalization (B1) if 
the discount rate is too large. Because price competition softens in WM, retailers’ profits are  
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larger (greater than zero) than in B2 and, for  0.7 γ > , joint retailers’ profits are greater than in 
the B1. 
From a social planner point of view, the optimal discount rate for maximizing consumer 
surplus and social welfare is 1 whereas producers’ surplus is maximized at γ =0.1 (see Figure 8). 
If, on the other hand, one wants to maximize joint profits between the manufacturer and the 
discount retailer the optimal discount rate is about 0.3 (see Figure 9). Finally, total welfare is 
always higher in WM than in either B1 or B2. 
3.5.  Reasonable Discount Rate for Wal-Mart 
  In the previous section, we present how the discount rate obtained by Wal-Mart affects 
prices,  quality, and welfare. In this section, we indirectly infer a reasonable range for the 
discount obtained by Wal-Mart using slotting fee information as, to the best of our knowledge, 
there is no such published information available. 
  As opposed to supermarkets,  Wal-Mart does not have any slotting fees or hidden 
allowances (Walton, 2005); instead it receives lower wholesale price as a compensation for shelf 
space (Klein and Wright, 2007).
14
  To focus on our main point, we  ignore  other  costs  in the following analysis.  A 
manufacturer’s profit when selling to a conventional retailer is 
 We use this differential treatment in slotting allowances to 
obtain a rough estimate of the plausible discount Wal-Mart can get from manufacturers.  
H wD S π = − , where S is the 
slotting allowance. Conversely, the profit when selling to Wal-Mart is  (1 ) L wD πγ = − , where  
L wD γ  represents the discount to Wal-Mart. Given the size of Wal-Mart and evidence of its 
bargaining power, a reasonable assumption is that the discount obtained by Wal-Mart is no less 
                                                 
14 In an article written by the editor of Baking Management, Seiz (2005), one finds the following quote “When you 
deal with a supermarket retailer, they negotiate with you once, then they negotiate with you about 15 times after that 
(…) You get your prices, and then there are slotting fees, advertising allowances, display allowances and tickets to 
the golf tournament.”  
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than S, i.e.,  L wD S γ ≥ .
15
  Table 3 in FTC (2003) has a ratio of slotting fee payments to new product revenues. In 
terms of our model, the ratio is computed by 
 Thus, if we have a measure of slotting fees, we can find a crude lower 
bound for Wal-Mart’s discount. 
/( ) S pD , where the subscript is omitted to simplify 
notation. Though the range of slotting fee values is large, on average the slotting fee (for all 
retailers/divisions) is 18%, it is 16% for ice cream, and 20% for salad dressing (products for 
which slotting fees are most often applied).
16
 
 To compare these values with Wal-Mart’s 







That is, the left hand side is a lower bound on Wal-Mart’s discount to price ratio. We compute 
the right hand side of this formula for our simulation results (for  [0.1,1] γ ∈ ) reported in Table 1. 
The second column of Table 2 contains the results of this calculation. We deem discounts rate 
above 0.4 as unlikely as they would imply equivalent slotting fees greater than 73%, an unlikely 
event. Similarly, a discount of 0.1 is equivalent to a slotting fee of 11.03%, which is unlikely 
given that slotting allowances are typically greater.  Using this reasoning, we  assume  that a 
reasonable range for Wal-Mart’s discount is [0.2, 0.4]. 
  Using this range, the results of the WM case can be better contrasted with those of the B1 
case.  First, the high-quality retailer provides significantly higher quality products/services to 
differentiate itself in response to Wal-Mart’s entry (Figure 2).  Second, retail prices decrease due 
to competition while wholesale price increases due to price discrimination (Figure 3). Third, 
                                                 
15 The significant pressure Wal-Mart places on upstream prices is illustrated by Rubbermaid’s merger with Newell, 
which was triggered by Rubbermaid’s loss of Wal-Mart’s business to lower price competitors. 
16 Not incorporating the 443% for ice cream for retailer 7 division 2.  
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because of competition and quality improvement, joint consumer surplus and joint producer 
surplus are higher (Figure 8).  
  We now turn to the comparison of the WM case with respect to the B2 case. First, we 
find that quality differentiation arises in the presence of Wal-Mart. Second, wholesale price 
increases due to price discrimination while quality differentiation (and the resulting softening of 
competition) pushes retail prices up (except for pL when γ  = 0.4). That is, Wal-Mart’s lower 
price in the case of replacing an existing supermarket occurs as long as the discount rate is 
relatively large (γ  = 0.4). Third, in terms of welfare, consumer surplus and producer surplus are 
higher except for consumer surplus when γ  = 0.3. A closer look at the components of consumer 
surplus reveals that the high-quality consumers get a larger portion of the increase in consumer 
surplus,  a result of quality improvement.  Our results suggest that when the discount rate is 
relatively small, the increase in welfare by low-quality consumers may not be as high as usually 
expected or claimed. 
  Our overall interpretation of the model indicates that Wal-Mart’s entry into a market 
whether by replacing a traditional retailer (WM vs. B2) or as a new entrant (WM vs. B1) is likely 
to positively affect total welfare (Figure 8). We next turn our attention to several robustness 
checks of our findings. 
4.  Robustness 
  To make our model tractable we made two important assumptions (1) consumer’s price 
sensitivity (x) is assumed to be equal to 1 in  y k xp θ +−, and (2) the coefficient of quality 
improvement cost for Wal-Mart (cL) is equal to 1. In this section we vary x and cL to investigate 
whether and how our main findings remain.   
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  First, we assume a price sensitivity parameter of x = 2. The results for  [0,0.3] γ ∈  are 
presented in Table 3. When consumers are more sensitive to price, we observe that a) the quality 
of service  for the high-quality retailer is lower  (although still higher than Wal-Mart’s for 
[0.1,0.3] γ ∈ ), b) the wholesale and retail prices are all lower (B1, B2 and WM cases), c) Wal-
Mart’s price falls below that observed in B2 when γ  = 0.3 (as opposed to 0.4 when x = 1); and d) 
the low- (high-) quality demand increases (decreases). Therefore, compared with results obtained 
for x = 1, low-quality consumers’ welfare is higher (due to lower prices) whereas high-quality 
customers’ welfare is smaller due to a smaller quality improvement; total consumer surplus may 
be higher or smaller, but both producer surplus and total welfare are smaller. 
  The intuition for these results is as follows. When faced with  more price sensitive 
consumers, the high-quality retailer’s incentives to improve quality erode; instead it has an added 
incentive to compete with the low-quality retailer  via more aggressive pricing.  Low-quality 
consumers gain at expense of the high-quality ones. The important finding is that, our main 
results remain (qualitatively) unchanged when we allow for more price sensitive consumers. 
Nevertheless, these results indicate that price sensitivity is an important factor in the model. 
  Next we explore the effect of different quality improvement costs for Wal-Mart (cL). 
Consistent with our assumption that  1 LH cc ≥= , we vary cL from 1 to 2 by 0.1 increments, and 
investigate its effects on the equilibrium quality levels. Because the optimal kL for all  [0.2,1] γ ∈  
is equal to 1 when cL = 1, increases in Wal-Mart’s quality improvement costs do not change Wal-
Mart’s quality level; i.e., kL = 1 for all  [0.2,1] γ ∈  for any  1 L c ≥  . As a consequence, kL and kH 
are the same as what we got in table 1 for all  [0.2,1] γ ∈  and  [1, ) L c ∈∞ . On the other hand, it is  
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reasonable to expect some impacts of changes in cL on equilibrium kL for γ = 0.1 as the optimal 
kL is greater than 1 in this case (see Tables 1 and 3).
17
The last two columns of Table 4 show as cL increases from 1 to 2, kL monotonically 
decreases from 1.0441 to 1.0249; conversely, kH increases slightly from 1.4674 to 1.4678. It is 
reasonable that Wal-Mart’s response to the raise of its quality improvement cost is more 
sensitive than the high-quality retailer. In the case of prohibitive quality improvement cost, i.e., 
 These results are reported in Table 4. 
L c →∞, Wal-Mart chooses not to improve its quality for  γ = 0.1 whereas the high-quality 
retailer sets the quality at the highest level 1.4683. As with our previous robustness check, results 
in Table 4 increase our confidence in our findings. 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we develop a simple model to study wholesaler-retailer relationships that 
accommodate for two key features of retail  markets: buyer market power and quality 
differentiation. Motivated by Wal-Mart’s increasingly pivotal role in food the retail industry, we 
study the effects of  a  large retail chain’s  buyer market power when it competes with 
conventional retailers.  To make our model computationally tractable we make some heroic 
assumptions about the industry: upstream supply is provided by a monopolist, there is a single 
product, product differentiation is vertical (i.e. in the quality dimension), and there is no 
transformation of the product downstream.  Despite this overly simplistic representation of the 
industry, our model does a remarkable job at predicting several observed patterns. 
The  occurrence of quality differentiation  in our model is quite robust (i.e.,  for any 
discount rate and different assumptions). This is consistent with McWilliams (2007) and Volpe 
and Lavoie (2008) who highlight how competitive pressure from Wal-Mart has driven traditional 
                                                 
17 Assuming that cL > 1 in the γ = 0 case is not relevant as B2 (the case of two conventional retailers) captures the 
essence of two identical retailers.  
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supermarkets to enhance the quality of the shopping experience by adding features like high-end 
private-label brands, deli, coffee shop, gourmet section, and gas station.  
Our framework also sheds light on a much debated issue of cost savings pass-through. 
The usual argument used by Wal-Mart advocates is that consumers are better off because they 
can purchase at lower prices. We find that indeed this effect can be present, but when firms have 
the option of being “different” from  Wal-Mart they  choose to do so thereby undermining 
otherwise more aggressive price competition (and therefore lower equilibrium prices).  This 
prediction is consistent with recent findings; Basker and Noel (2009) who report that Wal-Mart’s 
entry triggers different price responses from incumbent grocery stores: high-end grocery stores’ 
(such as Kroger) price reductions are less than half the size of those reported at low-end grocery 
stores. Put differently, Wal-Mart’s price effect will be larger in markets where low-quality stores 
already exist. 
In general, we find that total welfare increases with the presence of buyer market power. 
However, while consumers gain, most of the welfare increases are realized at the firm level. In 
particular, the biggest winner is the wholesaler who can profitably engage in price discrimination 
between the low-quality and the high-quality retailers.
18
While not explicitly modeled, our framework captures the essence of other variants. A 
wholesaler-retailer relationship can be more efficient in the presence of a large, sophisticated 
retailer. For example, Wal-Mart’s size can guarantee economies of scale in shipping. Also, 
recent technology innovations (such as radio frequency identification) that can be implemented 
in large and stable wholesaler-retailer relations can reduce inventory management costs. 
 Further, consumers’ gain is unevenly 
distributed, with the more high-quality concerned consumers earning a larger share of the gain.  
                                                 
18 We should interpret this result with caution as it may be specific to our assumption of a monopolistic upstream 
market structure.  
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Theoretically, a more (or less) cost-effective supply chain relationship will be captured by our 
model by appropriately modifying the discount factor. 
There are some caveats, however. Our comparison of price effects between B2 and WM 
indicates  that when Wal-Mart  replaces a conventional retailer, the price decreases for large 
discount values ( 0.4 γ ≥ ), which might be a short-run phenomenon. In the short-run, when firms 
cannot change the quality level, the entry of Wal-Mart would surely decrease prices. However, in 
the long-run, when firms are able to adjust quality, it is possible that Wal-Mart would choose to 
raise prices. Gregory (2009) reports that Wal-Mart is currently in the beginning stages of a 
strategy remodeling effort, called “Project Impact.” The Project is aimed at building up “cleaner, 
less cluttered stores that will improve the shopping experience, friendlier customer service, and 
focus on categories where the competition can be killed.” Also, Wal-Mart’s impacts on welfare 
are more complex than what the current model is able to capture; our approach is silent about the 
effects on the labor market, the local economy, traffic, pollution, etc. Our model considers a 
monopoly upstream, but with several sellers of a differentiated good upstream (e.g. some large, 
some small) buyer market power can foreclose smaller competitors thereby reducing varieties for 
the end consumers. 
As consolidation of retailers continues to increase, so does their seller market power. A 
valid concern is that the welfare loss due to the consolidation may dominate the gains associated 
with buyer market power. Although our model focuses on concentrated retail markets (with 1 or 
2 firms), it indirectly addresses this concern. Since the case of two  identical conventional 
retailers yields a perfectly competitive outcome, we can interpret it as a case of minimal 
concentration. Our results suggest that even an extreme move from this case to a duopoly where  
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Wal-Mart operates, the buyer market power gains outweigh the potential losses due to seller 
market power. 
In 2003, R. Hewitt Pate, the Justice Department’s antitrust chief, told a Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearing that: “…price fixing and other forms of collusion are just as unlawful when 
the victims are sellers rather than buyers,” when referring to cases of large downstream firms 
forcing upstream suppliers to lower their prices (Wilke, 2004). While there are several important 
aspects of the real world that our model does not capture (as noted above), our generally positive 
assessment of buyer market power suggests that the antitrust authorities’ view (as depicted in the 
statement above) may need to be carefully rethought. 
Finally, several extensions to our model may be worth exploring. Our assumption of an 
exogenous discount rate can be relaxed by  exploring  the  optimal discount rate  between the 
wholesaler and the large retailer using a Nash bargaining approach. Alternatively, discounts can 
be endogenously determined by allowing the upstream market structure to be non-monopolistic 
(as in Snyder, 1996). Finally, in many rural areas of the U.S. there was no retailer before Wal-
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Table 1: Simulation Results 
  γ  kB1  wB1  pB1  θB1  DB1  CSB1  πM(B1)  π B1  CSB1  PSB1  TWB1 
B1*  0.0000  1.2500  0.6250  0.9375  0.7500  0.2500  0.0391  0.1563  0.0729  0.0391  0.2292 0.2682 
  γ  kL  kH  w  pL  pH  θL  θH  DL  DH  CSL  CSH  πM  πL  πH  CS  PS  TW 
B2**  0.0000  1.0004 1.0004  0.5002  0.5002  0.5002  0.5000  0.5000  0.2500  0.2500  0.0625  0.0625  0.2501  0.0000  0.0000  0.1251  0.2501 0.3752 
WM*** 
0.1000  1.0441 1.4674  0.6425  0.5823  0.8241  0.5577  0.5711  0.0134  0.4289  0.0001  0.1410  0.2833  0.0001  0.0438  0.1410  0.3272 0.4682 
0.2000  1.0000 1.4410  0.6781  0.5631  0.8411  0.5631  0.6304  0.0673  0.3696  0.0023  0.1233  0.2871  0.0014  0.0317  0.1256  0.3202 0.4458 
0.3000  1.0000 1.3934  0.7008  0.5381  0.8162  0.5381  0.7067  0.1686  0.2933  0.0142  0.1094  0.2882  0.0080  0.0135  0.1236  0.3098 0.4334 
0.4000  1.0000 1.3190  0.6566  0.4712  0.7234  0.4712  0.7906  0.3194  0.2094  0.0510  0.0958  0.2633  0.0247  0.0032  0.1468  0.2912 0.4379 
0.5000  1.0000 1.2319  0.5230  0.3563  0.5556  0.3563  0.8596  0.5033  0.1404  0.1267  0.0828  0.2051  0.0477  0.0004  0.2095  0.2532 0.4627 
0.6000  1.0000 1.2005  0.4070  0.2626  0.4351  0.2626  0.8601  0.5975  0.1399  0.1785  0.0953  0.1542  0.0596  0.0012  0.2738  0.2151 0.4889 
0.7000  1.0000 1.2106  0.3451  0.2099  0.3828  0.2099  0.8210  0.6112  0.1790  0.1868  0.1288  0.1250  0.0650  0.0036  0.3155  0.1937 0.5092 
0.8000  1.0000 1.2330  0.3024  0.1741  0.3547  0.1741  0.7753  0.6012  0.2247  0.1807  0.1662  0.1043  0.0683  0.0075  0.3469  0.1802 0.5271 
0.9000  1.0000 1.2613  0.2684  0.1477  0.3387  0.1477  0.7309  0.5832  0.2691  0.1701  0.2026  0.0879  0.0705  0.0130  0.3727  0.1713 0.5440 
1.0000  1.0000 1.2926  0.2386  0.1274  0.3293  0.1274  0.6901  0.5627  0.3099  0.1583  0.2365  0.0740  0.0717  0.0198  0.3948  0.1654 0.5602 
Notes: * This row represents base case 1 (B1), where there is only one conventional retailer in the market (variables are denoted by B1 with 
either a superscript or in parentheses). 
  ** This row represents base case 2 (B2), where there are two conventional retailers in the market. 
*** These rows denote the Wal-Mart case (WM), where one of the two retailers is able to get a positive discount from the 
manufacturer. 
γ : discount rate (buyer market power measure) offered to the low-quality retailer. 
  kL and kH : low- and high -quality retail quality levels, respectively. 
     w : wholesale price. 
    pL and pH : low- and high -quality retail prices, respectively. 
    DL = θH - θL : low-quality demand; DH = 1-θH : high-quality demand. 
    CSL and CSH: consumer surplus for low- and high-quality groups, respectively. 
πM, πL, and πH: profits for wholesaler, low- and high-quality retailers, respectively 
  CS = CSL + CSH : total consumer surplus. 
PS = πM + πL + πH : total producer surplus. 
  TW= CS + PS: total welfare.  
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Table 2: Wal-Mart’s Received Unit Discount to Price Ratio 
 
 






0.1    11.03 
0.2    24.09 
0.3    39.07 
0.4    55.74 
0.5    73.41 
0.6    93.00 
0.7  115.11 
0.8  138.95 
0.9  163.56 
1.0  187.32 





Table 3: Simulation Results for x =2 
  γ  kB1  wB1  pB1  θB1  DB1  CSB1  πM(B1)  π B1  CSB1  PSB1  TWB1 
B1  0.0000*  1.1768  0.2942  0.4413  0.7500  0.2500  0.0368  0.0735  0.0349  0.0368  0.1085 0.1453 
  γ  kL  kH  w  pL  pH  θL  θH  DL  DH  CSL  CSH  πM  πL  πH  CS  PS  TW 
B2  0.0000  1.0000 1.0000  0.2500  0.2500  0.2500  0.5000  0.5000  0.2500  0.2500  0.0625  0.0625  0.1250  0.0000  0.0000  0.1250  0.1250 0.2500 
WM 
0.1000  1.0684 1.3282  0.3142  0.2887  0.3664  0.5405  0.5979  0.0573  0.4021  0.0018  0.1320  0.1426  0.0002  0.0092  0.1338  0.1520 0.2858 
0.2000  1.0000 1.3037  0.3213  0.2713  0.3722  0.5425  0.6647  0.1222  0.3353  0.0075  0.1143  0.1391  0.0017  0.0077  0.1217  0.1486 0.2703 
0.3000  1.0000 1.2534  0.3165  0.2488  0.3460  0.4975  0.7671  0.2696  0.2329  0.0363  0.0968  0.1334  0.0073  0.0014  0.1331  0.1422 0.2753 




Table 4: Robustness of Model to Different Values of cL, WM case 
  γ = 0.1 
cL  kL  kH 
1.0  1.0441  1.4674 
1.1  1.0406  1.4675 
1.2  1.0376  1.4676 
1.3  1.0352  1.4676 
1.4  1.0331  1.4677 
1.5  1.0313  1.4677 
1.6  1.0297  1.4677 
1.7  1.0283  1.4677 
1.8  1.0270  1.4678 
1.9  1.0259  1.4678 
2.0  1.0249  1.4678 
∞   1.0000  1.4683 
Note:  cL: coefficient of quality improvement cost for Wal-Mart. 
  kL and kH : low- and high -quality retail quality levels, respectively. 







Figure 1: Payoff Matrix for Two Conventional Retailers When γ = 0, B2 case 
 
    Retailer H 
    kH = 1  kH > 1 
Retailer L 
kL = 1  (  0 , 0  )  (0, 7/96) 
kL > 1  (7/96, 0)  (  0 , 0  ) 
Note:  kL and kH : quality levels for retailers L and H, respectively. 




Figure 2: Quality Levels Chosen by the Retailers 
 
Note:  kL and kH : low- and high -quality retail quality levels, respectively; 
kB1 : retail quality level in the B1 case. 
B1 case: only one conventional retailer in the market (i.e. with no buyer market power) 
B2 case: two conventional retailers in the market. 
0 γ >  corresponds to the WM case (one conventional retailer and one Wal-Mart store). 
Figure 3: Retail and Wholesale Prices 
 
Note: pH and pL : high- and low-quality retail prices, respectively; 
w and (1- γ) w: wholesale price for high-quality retailer and discounted wholesale price for 
low-quality retailer, respectively; 
pB1 and wB1 : retail and wholesale prices, respectively, in the B1 case. 
B1 case: only one conventional retailer in the market (i.e. with no buyer market power) 
B2 case: two conventional retailers in the market. 
0 γ >  corresponds to the WM case (one conventional retailer and one Wal-Mart store). 
γ 
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Figure 4: Retailer Price-Cost Margins and Pass-Through Rate for the Low-Quality 
Retailer 
 
Note:   w : wholesale price;   pL: low-quality retail price. 
γ : discount rate offered to the low-quality retailer. 
  PCML=(pL-(1-γ)w)/pL : price-cost margin for the low-quality retailer. 
  PCMH=(pH-w)/pH : price-cost margin for the high-quality retailer. 
  (w - pL)/ w γ : pass-through rate for the low-quality retailer. 
0 γ >  corresponds to the WM case (one conventional retailer and one Wal-Mart store). 
Figure 5: Demand 
 
Note:   High-quality demand: DH = 1-θH ; Low-quality demand: DL =θH - θL;  
Market Demand: DM = 1-θL; demand in the B1 case: DB1 = 1-θB1. 
B1 case: only one conventional retailer in the market (i.e. with no buyer market power) 
B2 case: two conventional retailers in the market. 
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Figure 6: Consumer Surplus 
 
Note: CSH and CSL: consumer surplus for high- and low-quality groups, respectively; 
 CSB1 : consumer surplus in the B1 case 
B1 case: only one conventional retailer in the market (i.e. with no buyer market power) 
B2 case: two conventional retailers in the market. 
0 γ >  corresponds to the WM case (one conventional retailer and one Wal-Mart store). 
 
Figure 7: Producer Surplus 
 
Note: πM, πH, and πL: profits for wholesaler, high- and low-quality retailers, respectively; 
πM(B1) and πB1: profits for wholesaler and retailer, respectively, in the B1 case. 
B1 case: only one conventional retailer in the market (i.e. with no buyer market power) 
B2 case: two conventional retailers in the market. 
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Figure 8: Total Consumer Surplus, Producer Surplus, and Welfare 
 
Note: Total consumer surplus CS = CSH + CSL; Total producer surplus PS = πL + πH + πL; 
 Total welfare TW = CS + PS. 
 CSB1, PSB1, and TWB1: consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total welfare, respectively, 
in the B1 case. 
B1 case: only one conventional retailer in the market (i.e. with no buyer market power) 
B2 case: two conventional retailers in the market. 
0 γ >  corresponds to the WM case (one conventional retailer and one Wal-Mart store). 
 
Figure 9: Joint Profits of Wholesaler and Low-Quality Retailer 
 
Note: πM and πL: profits for wholesaler and low-quality retailer, respectively. 
B2 case: two conventional retailers in the market. 
0 γ >  corresponds to the WM case (one conventional retailer and one Wal-Mart store). 
 
γ 
CSB1=0.0391 
PSB1=0.2292 
TWB1=0.2682 
B2 Case 
γ 
B2 Case 